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1. Membership of NATO and the EU is apriority of the foreign poli-
cies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The main stimulus that dri-
ves these membership aspirations is the will to ensure the secu-
rity of these countries and to ultimately separate them from the
post-Soviet space. Additionally, the authorities of the Baltic
States believe that membership of both these organisations will
make their counties more attractive for Western investors. 
The way to implement these priorities is not only through consis-
tent adjustments to the standards prevailing in NATO and the EU,
but it also involves refusing to join the post-Soviet structures and
seeking out states that are willing to strongly support the Baltic
StatesÕ aspirations. The implementation of this policy has resulted
in the status of the Baltic StatesÕ preparations for membership in
both international structures being assessed as good, and they are
r e c koned to be realistic candidates for NATO and EU enlargement. 
2. Apart from integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures, anoth-
er important objective of the Baltic StatesÕ policy is to develop
good relations with their neighbours, including Russia. However,
at the moment the Baltic Ð Russian relations appear to be fairly
frigid. Diplomatic contacts are sporadic, especially between rep-
resentatives of the highest authorities. Only the Lithuanians man-
age to sustain dialogue with Russia, but this dialogue brings
scarcely any results for either party. The Baltic StatesÕ authorities
seek to intensify their diplomatic contacts with the eastern neigh-
bour not only for economic reasons, but also because of their
NATO and EU membership aspirations. One of the most urgent
problems in Baltic Ð Russian relations is the legal resolution of
the issue of borders between Russia and Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia. As far as the signature or ratification of the respective
treaties is concerned, the only thing missing at the moment is the
positive decision on the part of the Russian Federation. 
The maintenance and development of good relations with Russia
is important for the Baltic States also because of their e c o n o m i e s Õ
dependence on continuous supplies of Russian energy raw mate-
rials. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia also seek to make sure that
Russian oil and oil products continue to be transited via the Baltic
ports to the West. Such transit is amajor source of income for the
three Baltic States.
3. Even though the Russian authorities appear to have alleviated
their policy towards the Baltic States during Vladimir PutinÕs
C E S  s t u d i e s
presidency, Russia is still endeavouring to keep the Baltic States
within the sphere of its political and economic influence. This pol-
icy is not identical to the policy which Russia implements in its
relations with the CIS states, as it aims rather to make the Baltic
States abuffer zone to separate Russia from the space dominat-
ed by the Western countries. This manifests itself most obvious-
ly in MoscowÕs persistent refusal to give approval to the Baltic
StatesÕ integration with NATO.
4. For Russia, the most effective way to impede the Baltic StatesÕ
endeavours to separate themselves from the post-Soviet zone is
to implement the policy of strengthening the economic position of
Russia within the Baltic States, which was developed back in the
times of Boris YeltsinÕs rule. Today, this strategy is being imple-
mented mainly through the Russian companiesÕ participation in
the privatisation of the Baltic StatesÕ strategic enterprises. Russia
also continues to implement its policy of discrediting the Baltic
States on the international scene, trying to present them as an
unstable region full of ethnic tension and ruled by the criminal
world. Moscow places most emphasis on the problems of the
Russian ethnic minority, pointing to the necessity to protect the
rights of its compatriots who involuntarily became inhabitants of
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Even though international institu-
tions that guard the maintenance of human rights generally con-
sider the Baltic StatesÕ legislation on minority problems to be
compliant with EU standards, Russia challenges these opinions. 
5. Since the prospects of the Baltic StatesÕ membership in the EU
are realistic, Russia is striving to secure its interests involving the
Kaliningrad Oblast, which will be surrounded by the EU states in
the future, and the rights of its citizens following the Baltic StatesÕ
accession to the Schengen treaty. RussiaÕs main goals include
securing abatements for civil, military and cargo transit to and
from Kaliningrad, or even obtaining a special status formula for
the Russian enclave. 
The Lithuanian authorities are aware that with regard to this
aspect of RussiaÕs policy, Lithuania occupies a special place as
the country that directly borders the Kaliningrad Oblast. In order
to avoid pressure from Russia, the Lithuanian authorities seek to
involve the EU in the dialogue with Moscow on the future of the
Kaliningrad Oblast, the objective of which is to prevent the isola-
tion of the enclave following EU enlargement. 
1. Goals of the Baltic States 
foreign policies
The strategic goal of the foreign policies of Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia is NATO and EU membership. The main stimulus that dri-
ves the Baltic1 StatesÕ actions aimed at integration with both NATO
and the EU is the will to ensure these countriesÕ security and to
separate them from the post-Soviet zone as soon as possible. 
The Baltic States applied for NATO membership in 1994, and one
year later they signed the treaties of association with the EU. For
the last two or three years, Lithuania, Latvia and EstoniaÕs efforts
to achieve membership of NATO and the EU were the most impor-
tant factor that determined their respective foreign policies. 
It is a significant fact that among the major political groups of
various orientations in the Baltic States there are none that ques-
tion these basic foreign policy goals. Since the time they applied
for NATO membership, all governments have maintained that
they were committed to sustaining the main priorities of their for-
eign policies. These priorities have also been endorsed by suc-
cessive presidents in their annual proclamations. The determina-
tion of the Baltic StatesÕ political elites in the face of integration
with the Euro-Atlantic structures manifests itself mainly in the
manner in which they have been carrying out the transformations
of their respective countriesÕ systems of government. In the
course of this process, the Balts were chiefly implementing
Western standards, trying to adjust each of the important areas
of state administration and the economy to the standards pre-
vailing in the EU. They were also trying to align their security and
defence practices with the standards of the NATO member states.
Having defined their strategic goals, the Baltic States have con-
sistently emphasised their readiness to participate in any inter-
national initiatives undertaken under the auspices of NATO and
the EU. They have also adopted the policy of Òmaximum anchor-
ingÓ in Europe and the Western world by successively acceding to
various Western institutions. At the moment, the Baltic States are
members of most of the major international organisations such
as the Council of Europe, WTO et al., through which they seek
support for the idea of NATO and EU enlargement. 
Even though all three Baltic States mention the necessity to
develop good relations with neighbours as one of their strategic
goals, in the case of Lithuania, Latvia and EstoniaÕs relations with
Russia this provision in practice remains dead. Russia avoids
dialogue with the Baltic States, especially with Latvia and
Estonia, as aresult of which the authorities of these countries are
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not able to achieve final solutions for any of the bilateral relations
issues, including the granting of RussiaÕs consent to the final 
resolution of the border problem that is of great importance for
the Baltic StatesÕ Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Action for NATO membership
The first development which enabled the Baltic States to start
their endeavours aimed at membership of NATO was the with-
drawal of the Russian armed forces from the territories of the
three already independent republics as a result of successful
negotiations2. Only then could the Baltic States officially apply for
NATO membership, which they did in 1994 and which was fol-
lowed shortly by their accession to the ÒPartnership for PeaceÓ
initiative. Since the moment they applied for membership,
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have been making intensive efforts
to accelerate their admission to NATO and to build up interna-
tional support for the idea of the inclusion of the Baltic States into
the Alliance. 
The authorities of these states not only energetically solicited
international support for the idea of enlargement, but also insist-
ed on the definition of specific conditions to be met by the candi-
dates, as was the case with the EU membership negotiations. The
comprehensive diplomatic action included intensive contact with
the authorities of NATO states and participation of the Baltic
StatesÕ representatives in international conferences devoted to
the issues of the Alliance enlargement. 
In 1999, during the Summit of the NATO member states in
Washington, its participants approved the Membership Action
Plan (MAP) which became the sole instrument to evaluate the sta-
tus of the preparations of the countries aspiring to NATO member-
s h i p3. Performance of the obligations set out in the MAP gives the
Baltic States an argument to support their claim that they are suc-
cessively adjusting to NATO standards. They can also argue that
as regards enlargement, the only thing they still miss is the posi-
tive political decision on the part of the AllianceÕs member states.
Among the three Baltic States, Lithuania shows the greatest
determination to integrate with NATO: it modernises its armed
forces and increases its defence budget at the highest rate.
Undoubtedly, the gradual increasing of defence expenditures to 
2 per cent of GDP per year is the most important obligation
towards the NATO states4.
The Baltic States actively join initiatives which aim to improve
security in Europe, in particular those undertaken to stabilise the
situation in the Balkans. Their commitment to supporting NATO
military and civil personnel in peace operations dates back to
1996 when the soldiers from the three Baltic States first joined
the SFOR and KFOR missions. 
Apart from modernising their armed forces, the Baltic States
actively seek opportunities to co-operate with NATO member
countries in order to be better prepared for their prospective
membership and to solicit support for the second wave of
enlargement of the Alliance. Each of the Baltic States pursues its
own policy of seeking supporters of its membership among the
Alliance member states. Lithuania is the most active in this
respect and has managed to establish a strategic partnership
with one of the AllianceÕs members, Poland. The politicians of
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are activising their national diaspo-
ras, mainly in the US, in order to exert pressure on US politicians.
These efforts are proving effective: today, the US is the most
influential ally of the Baltic States and a supporter of the idea of
NATO enlargement. (Nevertheless, in the US there are also com-
munities that call for caution with regard to further NATO enlarge-
ment.) All three Baltic States also count on support from Germany
and Denmark.
The process of privatisation of enterprises that were of strategic
importance for the Baltic StatesÕ economies, which started in the
late 90s, afforded an opportunity to achieve a new political goal,
i.e. to attract foreign investors. Apart from obvious economic
benefits, Western investments were to provide a counterbalance
for the political and economic influence of Russia that was build-
ing up in the Baltic region and to make sure that the West is inter-
ested in the stabilisation of the region. The supporters of this
concept, i.e. the right wing authorities of Lithuania and Estonia in
particular, promoted American capital as the only one able to pro-
vide a real counterbalance for the Russian influence in the Baltic
States region. It was expected that support for the US companiesÕ
economic interests will entail the US authoritiesÕ support for the
Baltic StatesÕ NATO membership aspirations. 
The right wing authorities implemented the concept of attracting
Western investments with such determination that they even
accepted unfavourable formulas of agreement with Western
investors, who were selected without prior tenders. It is worth
noting that these efforts of the Baltic StatesÕ governments met
with support from the US authorities. The most vivid example of
the implementation of the idea of ÒnaturalisationÓ of the Western
capitalÕs interests in the Baltic region was the agreement con-
cluded between the Lithuanian authorities and the Williams com-
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pany of the US. The 1999 agreement provided for the sale of 33
per cent of the shares of the Mazeikiu Nafta oil concern that was
of strategic importance for the Lithuanian economy. The Ameri-
cansÕ commitment failed to bring the expected economic results:
the Lithuanian Ð American oil concern Mazeikiu Nafta still gener-
ates losses and its American management board has not been
able to come to an agreement with the Russian companies with
regard to the supplies of oil. 
The authorities of Estonia have tried to implement a similar vari-
ant of privatisation, as they intended to sell 49 per cent of shares
of the two power plants in Narva to the US investor, ENG Energy.
However, the opposition and many experts found the preliminary
agreement controversial and unfavourable for the state. 
As a result, the departing government of Mart Laar terminated it
in mid January 2002.
Aspirations to EU Membership
In order to integrate with the West within the shortest time possi-
ble, the Baltic States have considerably accelerated the process
of negotiations with the EU in the recent years. This was possible
because of the previous economic reforms such as the introduc-
tion of a market economy, affranchisement of citizens, initiation
of the privatisation process, et al. The Baltic States have also
been making efforts to create a new image for themselves Ð that
of rapidly developing democratic states delivered from their
Soviet inheritance. In this respect, the activities of Estonia were
the most effective. Estonia was also the first to start the process
of negotiations with the EU, which commenced on March 31,
1998. Owing to its contacts with the Scandinavian countries, in
particular with Finland, which provided the Estonian authorities
with ready models of political and economic transformations,
Estonia found itself in the group of states that are considered by
the European Commission to be best prepared for EU member-
ship. At the moment (March 2002), the Estonians have closed as
many as 24 of the 31 negotiations chapters and in further nego-
tiations they intend to focus mainly on the seeking of the most
favourable possible terms rather than hastily closing successive
chapters. 
Even though Lithuania and Latvia initiated the process of their
negotiations with the EU as late as February 15, 2000, over the
last year they have considerably intensified their activities.
Lithuania has closed 24 negotiations chapters and Latvia has
closed 23. The governments of the three Baltic States intend to
complete the entire negotiations process by January 1, 2003 in
order to become members of the EU in 2004. 
The Baltic States get positive feedback from the European
Commission, which in its annual report of November 13, 2001,
confirmed the good status of the Baltic StatesÕ preparedness and
stated that they have achance of becoming members as soon as
2004. The Baltic StatesÕ hopes for EU membership were endorsed
again by the final document of the European UnionÕs summit in
Laeken in December 2001. The document contained a list of 10
EU candidate states, including Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia,
which had a chance to become members in 2004, provided they
maintained the present rate of negotiations and reforms. 
Even though the general opinion of the status of the Baltic StatesÕ
preparations for EU membership is good, relations between
Brussels and Lithuania are still troubled by the problem of the
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant. The EU firmly insists that this
power plant should be closed down because, from the viewpoint
of construction, it is the same type as the Chernobyl plant. The
Lithuanian authorities, regardless of their political affiliation,
keep postponing the decision to completely close down the
Ignalina plant. This power plant provides approx. 80 per cent of
LithuaniaÕs electricity and enables the country to profit from
exports. Closing it down would require huge amounts of funding,
which Lithuania does not have5. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian
authorities are aware that even though the EU cannot formally
make its consent to admit Lithuania conditional on the latterÕs
obligation to close down the Ignalina plant, the firm stand of the
highest EU officials shows clearly that negotiations with Lithuania
will not be completed until the decision to close down Ignalina by
2009 is taken6.
2. The Baltic StatesÕ interests
involving the Russian Fe d e r a t i o n
From the point of view of the foreign policy priorities pursued by
the Baltic States, the necessity to ultimately regulate the relations
with Russia appears to be particularly important, as the latter
country is their closest neighbour and the only state with which
the basic regulations are still missing. This absence of acompre-
hensive and formal regulation of the relations with Russia (recog-
nition of borders) may become an obstacle impeding the attain-
ment of the Baltic StatesÕ strategic goals in the future, even
though formally neither the Washington Treaty nor the Schengen
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Treaty impose requirements that state aspiring to membership of
NATO and the EU should have their borders finally regulated. At
the present stage of negotiations, the international organisations
appear to be accepting the fact that the border lines between the
three Baltic States and Russia are preliminarily drawn and that
the borders are protected in compliance with European stan-
dards. Nevertheless, the traffic between the Baltic States and
Russia is impeded because the crossing of borders is subject to
visa procedures. Concessions were granted only to the inhabi-
tants of the Kaliningrad Oblast who may cross the border with
Lithuania without visas, based on ordinary identity documents. 
Even though Russia does not officially use the argument of final
border agreements with the Baltic States to restrict their Euro-
Atlantic aspirations, it may try to emphasise this problem in the
international forum in connection with other issues that it has
been exploiting, such the rights of the Russian-speaking ethnic
minority in Latvia and in Estonia, the broadly understood transit
to and from the Kaliningrad Oblast through Lithuania, and the
Baltic StatesÕ waiver of the financial claims for indemnity from
losses incurred during the Soviet occupation. 
Borders
Among the three Baltic States, only Lithuania has managed to
sign the agreement on demarcation of the state border with
Russia (October 1997). The problem is not solved completely
though, because the bilateral agreement has been ratified by the
Lithuanian parliament only7. The Russian State Duma has been
postponing ratification, as a result of which the Lithuanians have
to continue their efforts to finally solve the issue, like the Latvians
and the Estonians, with whom Russia has not even signed simi-
lar treaties and continues to postpone the signing.
The Baltic States have already exhausted the realistic capacity of
by themselves of inducing Russia to negotiate the borders issue,
especially since the diplomatic contact of the Latvians and
Estonians with Russia are fairly scarce. Inter-government com-
missions meet only a few times a year (in the case of Latvia they
do not meet at all), and their meetings fail to produce any signif-
icant solutions. For several years, the Latvian and Estonian
authorities have been struggling in vain to increase the frequen-
cy of official contacts at the highest level. As regards the slightly
more viable Lithuanian Ð Russian relations, the official visits of
both the President and the Prime Minister of Lithuania to Moscow
in 2001 failed to introduce a new quality into bilateral relations
and the issue of ratification of the border treaty was not even
mentioned. 
The fact that Russia evades negotiations on the signing of border
treaties serves to emphasise that its relations with the Baltic
States are frigid and to create the impression on the internation-
al scene that there are problems in the mutual relations. One
could say that this kind of policy is mainly an expression of
RussiaÕs refusal to accept the Baltic StatesÕ aspirations to
become members of NATO.
Raw material dependence 
and the transit issue
The Baltic StatesÕ permanent problem, which is also important
from the point of view of their endeavours to obtain invitations to
join NATO and the EU, is the economic dependence of Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia on Russian supplies of energy raw materials.
The three countries are one hundred percent dependent on sup-
plies of Russian gas and oil8. The efforts made so far to at least
partly end the energy dependence on Russia have failed. To d a y,
even the most anti-Russian elites in the Baltic States tend to
realise that there is no alternative to Russian energy raw materi-
als, which are cheap and are frequently sold on preferential terms.
The most vivid example of the failure of the policy to seek Western
supplies of raw materials irrespective of costs was the decision
to build the expensive oil terminal in Butinge in Lithuania, taken
by the Lithuanian right-wing groups in the early 90s. Although the
newly built terminal enabled Lithuania to accept oil sent from the
West by sea, the country could not afford to keep buying large
quantities of Western raw materials at world prices.
Consequently, instead of handling the import of Western oil, the
terminal survives only by exporting the Russian oil to the West.
Pa r a d o x i c a l l y, the terminal which was supposed to make
Lithuania independent continues to consolidate the presence of
Russian capital. 
At the moment, there is no-one in the political elites of the Baltic
States who would question the fact that it is in the three Baltic
StatesÕ best economic interests to secure permanent supplies of
energy raw materials from Russia. These supplies are the foun-
dation of the economies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and it
is owing to them that the strategic facilities of these countries,
such as the Baltic StatesÕ only oil refinery in Mazeikiai, Lithuania,
the largest port and oil terminal, LatviaÕs Ventspils, as well as
smaller ports and terminals like the ones in Klaipeda, Butinge or
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Tallinn, can continue to operate. The functioning of these facilities
is closely connected with the transit of Russian oil and oil prod-
ucts through the territories of the Baltic States and with the
export of these materials via the Baltic ports. Russian transit, not
only of raw materials but also of goods, through the Baltic States
is also an important source of permanent revenues for Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia9, even though the launch of the first part of the
oil terminal in Primorsk near St. Petersburg by the Russian
authorities, which took place towards the end of December 2001,
may cause a reduction in the income of the Baltic terminalsÕ. 
3. The Russian Fe d e r a t i o n Õ s
interests involving the Baltic
S t a t e s
During the rule of Boris Yeltsin, as well as in the early period of
Vladimir PutinÕs presidency, Russia was consistently and firmly
opposed to the Baltic StatesÕ membership of NATO. The reasons
why Russia objected to the admission of the Baltic States into the
Alliance included the fact that these countries had been part of
the USSR, and Russia perceived them as apermanent element of
the post-Soviet space. At present Russia still refuses to accept
the Baltic StatesÕ potential membership of NATO but its rhetoric
of hard objection is now less strict. 
The important reasons why the Baltic countries remain within the
sphere of interests of Russian business, irrespective of the politi-
cal situation in Russia itself and in the Baltic States, are eco-
nomic. In the Baltic States the mechanisms of market economy
have been in place for ten years, which makes these countries
reliable economic partners. The considerable stake that the
Russian business has in the economies of these countries means
that following the enlargement of the EU, Russia will gain easier
access to EU markets. 
From MoscowÕs point of view, it is also important that the Baltic
States possess industrial infrastructures, and in particular the
well equipped, deep and year round ice free seaports that form 
an important link for the Russian exports of oil and oil products.
The largest Baltic port, i.e. the Latvian port of Ventspils, handles
11 per cent of the Russian oil exports10. The distance from the
Russian border to the sea is shorter than, for example, in the case
of Ukraine, which reduces the costs of transit. The fact that there
are several ports in these countries enables Russia to negotiate
favourable tariffs and to stimulate competition among the Baltic
ports. The newly launched terminal in Primorsk, much shallower
and subject to freezing up in winter, will surely not be able to take
all of the oil transit business away from the Baltic ports. 
The Kaliningrad Oblast issue
The problem of the Kaliningrad OblastÕs future has an important
effect on the process of NATO and EU enlargement and on the
admission of the Baltic States. This refers in particular to
Lithuania, which directly borders the Russian enclave. Due to the
location of the Kaliningrad Oblast, which is separated from the
territory of Russia proper, Russia cannot afford to give up co-
operation with Lithuania completely, because the territory of the
latter is the shortest and most cost-effective land route that pro-
vides contact with the enclave. Apart from the fact that the
Russian ethnic minority in Lithuania faces no major problems, the
presence of the border with Kaliningrad is the factor owing to
which RussiaÕs relations with Lithuania are slightly better than its
relations with Latvia or Estonia. 
In the context of LithuaniaÕs prospective membership of NATO
and the EU, the issue of human and cargo traffic to and from the
Kaliningrad Oblast remains particularly important. The necessity
for Lithuania to implement the Schengen Treaty which regulates
human traffic by July 2003 will certainly generate impediments to
transit. But the Lithuanians fear that the introduction of visas
could reduce the profits that Lithuania derives from human and
cargo transit to and from Kaliningrad. Therefore, the Lithuanian
side wants to retain the concessions on visa procedure to which
the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad Oblast are entitled, which is in
line with RussiaÕ expectations. For this reason, Lithuania seeks to
develop a system of visa procedure concessions for the Oblast
inhabitants. 
Another important issue for Russia is the transit of Russian mili-
tary and hazardous cargoes through the territory of Lithuania.
Russia is endeavouring to get Lithuania to sign a long term bilat-
eral agreement on military transit with Russia before LithuaniaÕs
accession to the EU. While Lithuania is willing to negotiate solu-
tions for civil transit that are approved by the EU following possi-
ble discussions with Russia, its position with respect to RussiaÕs
military transit is fixed. At the moment, transit of military and
hazardous cargo takes place by train, in compliance with the
terms established by the Lithuanian party exclusively, based on
the agreement of 1993 which specified the procedure for with-
drawing the Russian army from Lithuania11. The Lithuanians ex-
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tend the validity of these terms each year and the Russians are
notified of it. The Lithuanian authorities do not want any changes
to the present mode of Russian military transit and endeavour to
have the problems existing between Lithuania, the Oblast and
Russia considered exclusively under EU legislation and to have
Russia treat Lithuania as a future member of the EU and NATO
who has its own obligations towards both these organisations.
Lithuania stresses that the terms of transit communicated to the
Russians were developed taking into consideration the standards
in force in the EU.
In early April 2001, the Lithuanian media reported that Moscow
had communicated apackage of its demands regarding the future
of the Kaliningrad Oblast to Brussels and Vilnius. What the
Russians demanded was first and foremost the granting of aspe-
cial status to RussiaÕs civil and military transit to and from the
Kaliningrad Oblast through the territory of Lithuania and the con-
tinuation of visa-free traffic following LithuaniaÕs accession to the
EU. Thus, Russia for the first time started to insist that the deci-
sion on LithuaniaÕs membership of the EU should be considered
in connection with the Kaliningrad Oblast issue. Faced with the
LithuaniansÕ objection, the Russians also suggested that in return
for the signature of a separate agreement on military transit, the
Duma might consider the border treaty ratification issue. These
kinds of suggestions were made most frequently several months
before the Lithuanian President Valdas AdamkusÕ visit to Moscow
in March 2001. Certainly, the issue of the border treaty ratifica-
tion may be the argument that Russia will use most frequently in
the negotiations in order to make sure that the terms of future
relations between Lithuania, aspiring to EU membership, and the
Oblast, are favourable for the latter. Such a position was pre-
sented on behalf of Russia by Dmitri Rogozin, Chairman of the
Russian State DumaÕs Foreign Affairs Commission, during the
meeting of parliamentary groups in Moscow in December 2001.
He univocally linked the issue of ratification of the border treaty
with Lithuania with the problems relating to the Kaliningrad Oblast
that will arise once LithuaniaÕs becomes a member of the EU1 2.
Undoubtedly, Lithuania tries to make the fact that it borders the
Kaliningrad Oblast an asset in its negotiations with the EU by
building its position as an intermediary in the relations between
the EU and Russia with regard to the future of the Kaliningrad
Oblast. It should be remembered that Lithuania and Poland are
the only states that maintain consular agencies in the Oblast. The
fact that this kind of informal status is there enables Lithuania to
actively participate in international projects affecting the enclave,
which aim to involve this region in European co-operation. One of
the major achievements of LithuaniaÕs foreign policy in the recent
years is the fact that the EU politicians largely take into consid-
eration LithuaniaÕs opinions and assessments in the internation-
al debate on the future of Kaliningrad. The Lithuanians have con-
tributed considerably to the development of the European
CommissionÕs report entitled ÒThe EU and KaliningradÓ (pub-
lished in January 2001). Among other issues, this report reflect-
ed the Lithuanian authoritiesÕ opinions on the future of the
Russian enclave13.
Kaliningrad and Lithuania are also dynamically developing re-
gional co-operation14 and commercial contacts. On June 13,
2000, the Council for Co-operation between Lithuania and the
Kaliningrad Oblast was formed, it meets at least twice a year. In
February 2000, Lithuania and Russia developed their joint pro-
posals under the EUÕs Northern Dimension initiative, which aimed
to ensure stability in the Oblast. These proposals provided for
a large number of joint LithuanianÐRussian projects in the areas
of economics, environmental protection, enterprise et al. 
Lithuania also tries to maintain its own dialogue with Russia by
making proposals to its neighbour aimed at enhancing mutual
confidence and thus improving security. It was Lithuania who
marked the recognition of the inclusion of Kaliningrad into the
Council of the Baltic Sea StatesÕ regional projects as a priority
during its presidency of the Council in 1999. 
The Russian ethnic minority problem
In the Baltic States, especially in Latvia and Estonia, there are
large populations of the Russian ethnic minority or the so called
Russian-speaking minority. The members of these minorities
have different formal statuses in Lithuania and Estonia, because
in the early 90s Lithuania was the only state to treat national
minorities in the same way as native Lithuanians and to permit
all persons permanently residing in Lithuania to obtain Lithuanian
citizenship irrespective of their declared nationality. One should
remember, though, that in Lithuania the Russian-speaking minor-
ity accounts for as little as approx. 11 percent of the population,
and of this, 8 percent are Russians. In Latvia and Estonia the per-
centage of the Russian-speaking minority in the total number of
inhabitants is much higher. In Latvia, the minority accounts for
approx. 40 percent of the population (with 32 percent being
Russians) and in Estonia for approx. 32 percent (with 28 percent
being Russians)15. The basic problem with the Russian-speaking
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population is the fact that in Latvia and Estonia there still exist
large groups of Russian-speaking people who are not Latvian or
Estonian citizens. Of the 2.4 million population of Latvia, only 1.8
million are Latvian citizens. Over 500 thousand people have no
citizenship at all. They are Russian-speaking and use separate
passports with the entry alien, which are issued to people with-
out any specific citizenship. Approximately 75 thousand are citi-
zens of Russia or other countries of the CIS, most frequently
Belarus. In Estonia, of the 1.4 million of inhabitants 1.1 million
are Estonian citizens. 180 thousand people have no citizenship:
these are Russian-speaking people who use separate passports
for persons without citizenship. Approx. 20Ð30 thousand are cit-
izens of Russia or other CIS states. While international institu-
tions do not challenge the fact that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
are fully democratic states, Russia continually tries to put to
doubt, in the international forum, whether they fully honour
minority rights. It should be emphasised that in the recent years,
Latvia and Estonia considerably liberalised their initially rigorous
ethnic minority legislation16.
Even though at the moment the Latvian and Estonian national
ethnic minority rights legislation is compliant with EU require-
ments, Russia continues to accuse the Latvians and Estonians of
breaching the Russian minorityÕs rights. MoscowÕs vocal objec-
tions, frequently reinforced with protests of the minorityÕs repre-
sentatives who are especially dissatisfied with the scope of use
of the Russian language, have been adversely affecting the inter-
national image of Latvia and Estonia, and prolonged the stay of
the OSCE missions in Riga and in Tallinn. 
The authorities of both Baltic States have adopted the policy of
consistently complying with the OSCEÕs requirements. The break-
through came with the amendment of the electoral regulations
passed by the Estonian parliament in November 2001, which
abolished the requirement that persons running for seats in par-
liaments and self-governments were obliged to know the state
language. As a result of the Estonian parliamentÕs decision, on
December 13, 2001 the Permanent Council of the OSCE decided
to close down the OSCE mission in Tallinn from 2002. The OSCEÕs
decision to close down the mission in Riga, which was taken on
the 18 th of December, was a consequence of the declaration of
LatviaÕs President Vaira Vike-Freiberga, who said that Latvia
would pass an analogous amendment to its electoral regulations.
The closure of both missions will surely deprive Russia of an
influential argument which it has been using in the international
scene to discredit the Baltic States but it is doubtful if the clo-
sures will abate RussiaÕs protests. Shortly after the closing of
both missions Alexander Alexeyev, RussiaÕs OSCE representative,
fiercely criticised this decision, calling it an extremely politicised
and absolutely unmotivated step. 
4. RussiaÕs ways to secure its
interests in the Baltic States 
Faced with the Baltic StatesÕ intensified dialogue with interna-
tional organisations, Russia developed the assumptions of its
future policy towards this region back in the times of Boris
YeltsinÕs rule. The main objective was to keep the Baltic States
within the sphere of RussiaÕs influence. In 1997, acting at
President Ye l t s i nÕs request, the Foreign and Defence Po l i c y
Council developed the ÒLong Term Concept of RussiaÕs Policy
Towards the Baltic StatesÓ which first and foremost recommended
the reinforcement of RussiaÕs economic position in Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia. The assumptions of this concept were based
on economic pragmatism which replaced the former policy of
threats that had prevailed in relations with the Baltic States. 
It should be emphasised that even though Russia has a new
president now, the recommendations set out in this document are
in fact being implemented even today. The difference is the fact
that during Vladimir PutinÕs presidency, Russia no longer resorts
to instruments of political pressure such as the blocking of ener-
gy raw materials supplies or economic sanctions, which used to
be applied frequently in the past. 
Securing a stake in privatisation
At the moment, the basic instrument to implement the strategy of
reinforcing RussiaÕs economic position in the Baltic States is the
taking over of control of these countriesÕ strategic enterprises,
especially in the power industry. In order to attain this, Russian
giant companies are trying to actively participate in the privatisa-
tion process that is now in progress in the Baltic States. A vivid
example of this practice is the gradual taking over of control of
the Latvian gas distribution enterprise Latvijas Gaze by Russian
companies. The gradual acquisition of Latvijas Gaze shares by
the Russians, which started back in 1997, ruined the balance
between Russian and Western shareholders which the Latvian
authorities had designed. As a result of the successive instalments
of selling blocks of shares in the Latvian gas enterpriseÕs, the
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Russian Gazprom concern and Itera Latvija, the LatvianÐRu s s i a n
company associated with Gazprom which acts as an intermediary
in the import of gas to Latvia, acquired 49 percent of shares in
this enterprise. Even though these two companies have still not
jointly acquired a majority block of shares, Gazprom and Itera
have six representatives in the eleven-member Board of Latvijas
Gaze, while the remaining shareholders, the Western Ruhrgas
and E.ON Energy, have five representatives. Thus the Russians
exercise actual control over the Latvian enterprise. 
Other examples of the reinforcement of RussiaÕs economic posi-
tion include the Russian companiesÕ attempts to take over major-
ity blocks of shares in LithuaniaÕs strategic enterprises, i.e. the
Mazeikiu Nafta oil concern and the Lietuvos Dujos gas distribu-
tor. The many years of efforts by LUKoil, which aimed to take over
control of Mazeikiu Nafta, combined with interruptions of oil sup-
plies to the Mazeikiu refinery, have failed. In spite of major finan-
cial losses, the Lithuanians stuck to the Western investor, the
Williams company of the US, which was supposed to negotiate
the supply of raw materials with the Russians. The uncompro-
mising position of the LUKoil concern, which demanded a major-
ity block of shares and the right to manage Mazeikiu Nafta, led to
the complete failure of negotiations and opened the way for
Jukos, another Russian oil company. In December 2001, Williams
terminated the preliminary agreement with Jukos too because the
Americans were dissatisfied with its terms and conditions. Both
the Lithuanian authorities and the US investor are aware that the
only realistic solution for Mazeikiu Nafta, which generates ever
deeper losses, is an agreement on long-term supplies concluded
with one of the Russian oil companies. Today it is difficult to fore-
see which of the Russian suppliers will ultimately become
Mazeikiu NaftaÕs partner. However it is sure that the main objec-
tive of each of the Russian companies will be to take over
a majority block of shares in the Lithuanian enterprise. The pos-
sible yielding to the pressure of any of the Russian companies
would be a major step towards the dependence of Lithuanian
economy on Russia. 
Another chance for Russian business was afforded by the pri-
vatisation process of Lietuvos Dujos, the gas distribution enter-
prise, which was initiated by the Lithuanian authorities in autumn
2001. Even before the privatisation model of Lietuvos Dujos was
publicised, RussiaÕs Gazprom demanded a controlling block of
shares in the enterprise. The Russian concern had a serious
argument and at the same time an instrument of pressure, this
being the low price which the Lithuanians pay for continuous sup-
plies of Russian material. Initially, it appeared that the left wing
groups that rule Lithuania at the moment would yield to the pres-
sure from Gazprom but the final version of the privatisation
model, developed by the government of Algirdas Brazauskas, ren-
dered it impossible for Gazprom to acquire a majority block of
shares, at least in the first phase of privatisation. The enter-
priseÕs strategic shareholder is to be a Western investor, to whom
the state has allocated 34 per cent of the shares. In the second
phase, which is to start in summer 2002, Gazprom can acquire
34 percent of the shares through a tender. Following completion
of the two phases of privatisation, the state will retain 24 percent
of the shares. At the moment, it is difficult to foresee to whom it
will sell its shares, but it is not precluded that as in Latvia, the
buyer may be one of the companies closely associated with
Gazprom. 
Similarly, it is impossible to forecast today the course of the pri-
vatisation of the Latvian oil terminal in Ventpils, which is sched-
uled for 2002. It is, however, possible to assume that the fact that
the Russians have launched the oil terminal in Primorsk will force
the Lithuanian authorities to consider the participation of Russian
oil companies in the privatisation of Ventspils. Only Russian
investors will be able to ensure that the Ventspils terminal con-
tinues to export Russian oil in quantities similar to those export-
ed today.
Pro-Russian lobbies
Another important instrument of RussiaÕs pursuits in the Baltic
States is the local business lobbies associated with Russian
business. The activities of these groups focus on the most impor-
tant sectors of the Baltic StatesÕ economies, these being transit
and transhipment of goods. The representatives of these financial
and industrial formations gained the influence that they now exert
mainly as a result of the so called Òwild privatisationÓ process
during which they took over major blocks of shares in important
enterprises from various sectors of the economy in the first years
of the Baltic StatesÕ independence. The money thus earned
enabled them to establish new companies closely connected with
the most profitable transit of Russian materials, i.e. gas and oil.
The Russian companies held considerable shares in the interme-
diary companies established in this way such as Itera Lietuva,
Stella Vitae, Itera Latvia or LUKoil Baltija. 
In order to strengthen their influence, the Baltic companies creat-
e d industrial and financial organisations such as the Corporation
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of Western Lithuania, the Confederation of Industrialists of
Lithuania, the Estonian Industrial and Commercial Chamber, and
the Latvian Transit Business Association. They exert considerable
influence on the authorities of particular Baltic States: their rep-
resentatives directly or indirectly participate in the making of the
most important political and economic decisions and finance the
electoral campaigns of major politicians and political parties.
This mechanism operates most overtly in Estonia, where in 1999
the Prime Minister Mart Laar signed a memorandum with repre-
sentatives of the Estonian business organisations. Under this
memorandum, private enterprises were granted the right to par-
ticipate in the decision making process in such strategic areas of
the economy as the energy and transport sectors, and to take part
in the working of the state supervision bodies and governmental
commissions, including in the process of formulating laws and
bills. Even though the Estonian government claimed that this
decision was motivated by its willingness to introduce more
transparency and to simplify the state administration system, 
it is worrying that members of the financial organisations in
question focus their activities mainly around the transit business,
which is inseparably bound with Russian companies. 
The business organisations have become more active over the
last two to three years as the process of privatisation of the so
called strategic enterprises gathered momentum. The participa-
tion of companies from these organisations in the privatisation
process means that their Russian partners will also get involved,
independently of the privatisation proposals made by the giant
Russian companies such as Gazprom or LUKoil themselves. This
situation is particularly favourable for the Russian businesses. In
this way, the Russian companies can acquire more control over
particular privatised enterprises, as they play a dual role of
Eastern and local investors.
Defamation campaign
Since the very moment of the Baltic StatesÕ declaration of inde-
pendence, the Russian secret services have been taking mea-
sures to represent the Baltic States as an area of political insta-
bility and feeble democracies shaken by frequent political scan-
dals. These efforts largely created afalsified reality. The methods
used were typical for the Russian secret services and included
leaks about Estonian ÒspiesÓ and discrediting of politicians,
mainly those from the right wing, both in terms of morality and
their actual or alleged past involvement in espionage. 
The activities of the secret services were combined with the
Russian authoritiesÕ parallel negative campaign against the Baltic
States, which went on during YeltsinÕs presidency and continued
in the era of PutinÕs rule. Its core consists of accusations that the
Baltic States, in particular Latvia and Estonia, breach their
Ru s s i a n -speaking populationsÕ rights. Russia levels such
charges in the international forum, especially in the OSCE.
A convenient instrument, both for the covert activities of the
Russian secret services and for reinforcement of RussiaÕs official
charges against the Baltic States, is offered by the Russian-lan-
guage media in the Baltic States. Like the Russian press, they
keep representing Latvia and Estonia as pro-nazi countries that
are full of ethnic tension and support Chechen terrorism. The
publications also point out that in the Baltic States there are
strong criminal groups that deal mainly with smuggling and the
drug business. The media campaign was validated by the fre-
quent protests of the active and well organised Russian ethnic
mi n o r i t y, which were directed against the policy towards minorities
implemented by the Baltic StatesÕ authorities, and these statesÕ
aspirations to join NATO and the EU. These activities ran parallel to
the fierce protests of the Russian nationalist groups who demon-
strated in front of the Baltic StatesÕ diplomatic agencies in Moscow,
getting extensive coverage from the Russian media1 7.
Ru s s i aÕs efforts to create a negative reality make the Baltic States
fear that as the moment at which the West will take the decision on
Lithuania, Latvia and EstoniaÕs membership of NATO and the EU is
n e a r i n g, the campaign of provocation may heighten dangerously.
The situation after 11th of September 
The rapprochement between NATO and Russia, which followed
the 11th of September terrorist attacks against the USA, was gen-
erally received in the Baltic States as a chance for the materiali-
sation of NATOÕs eastward expansion. It should be noted that the
authorities of the Baltic States took the opportunity afforded by
the formation of the world anti-terrorist coalition to emphasise
their readiness to co-operate with NATO on the same terms as
other states which are members of the Alliance. To this end,
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia did not just express their univocal
support for the military operation against the terrorists: Lithuania
responded positively to the USÕs appeal to make available
LithuaniaÕs airspace for NATO operations, and the governments of
Latvia and Estonia declared they would do the same if requested.
The Baltic StatesÕ authorities not only emphasised their loyalty to
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NATO, but also offered to actively support the international anti-
terrorist coalition. The Lithuanian authoritiesÕ proposal to send
a team of doctors to the Central and Southern Asia region with the
Czech medical unit serves as an example of this. 
Only initially did the improvement of the Russian-American rela-
tions arouse fears in the Baltic States that given the need to
reshape the world security system, the NATO enlargement
process might become lower priority. The question was asked
whether Russia, the main opponent of NATO enlargement, will not
make its participation in the anti-terrorist coalition conditional on
the halting of the process of NATOÕs eastward expansion. Such
fears were effectively alleviated by the assurances, coming main-
ly from the US, that NATOÕs gates remained opened. The Baltic
States considered it a success that the House of Representatives
of the US Congress supported the process of NATO enlargement18.
The visit of the NATO Secretary General George Robertson to
Moscow in November 2001 and the meeting of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the NATO member states held in Brussels in
early December 2001 (as aresult of which the possibility to make
room for Russia in the North Atlantic Alliance was first consid-
ered) were received by the Balts as a major change in RussiaÕs
relations with NATO, which may have a positive impact on the
Baltic States aspirations to NATO membership. 
The fact that in the Baltic States there is no debate on the chang-
ing formula of NATO is worthy of note. Neither the statement of
President Vladimir Putin, who said on the 3rd of October 2001 in
Brussels that Russia will reconsider its position on NATO enlarge-
ment if the Alliance transforms itself into a political organisation,
nor the further debates between NATO states and Russia which
aimed at defining anew formula for co -operation between Russia
and the Alliance, inspired the Baltic StatesÕ politicians to reflect
on whether the new formula of NATO will really guarantee securi-
ty for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This attitude aims first and
foremost to emphasise that whatever the situation, the Baltic
States will not give up their efforts to become NATO members. 
At the moment, the political elites and media in the Baltic States
evidently seem to rely on the positive signals from the West with
respect to NATO enlargement. It is also apparent that the politi-
cians are unwilling to analyse RussiaÕs attitude towards enlarge-
ment more thoroughly, which is meant to stress that the Balts
believe the political decision on the AllianceÕs enlargement to be
within the exclusive competence of the West.
In spite of this optimism, the authorities of the Baltic States are
aware that even though Russia has abated its rhetoric of firm
objection against the inclusion of the Baltic States into NATO, it
has not approved either. This is attested to by the fierce negative
response of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the infor-
mation that the OSCE missions in Latvia and Estonia were to be
closed down in December 2001. Noteworthy is also the new tone
of the statements by President Putin who compared the situation
of the Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic States with the 
situation of the Albanians in Macedonia in a television debate19.
The most recent statements by the Russian authorities prove
clearly that, as was said before, Moscow uses the issue of the
Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia to discredit the Baltic
States on the international scene and thus to impede their inte-
gration with NATO.
P r o s p e c t s
1. The temporary abatement of RussiaÕs rhetoric of strict objec-
tion against the eastward expansion of NATO, which followed
September 11, 2001, as well as the positive signals coming from
the West, have made the Baltic States convinced that during the
NATO summit in Prague in November 2002, Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia will be invited to join the Alliance. The fact that anew for-
mula of NATOÕs co-operation with Russia is being developed cer-
tainly has not and will not weaken Lithuania, Latvia and EstoniaÕs
aspirations to membership of the Alliance. This is so because
apart from NATO membership, these countries have no alterna-
tive way to ensure their security. The Baltic States have shown
their great determination to become members of the Alliance by
emphasising their loyalty to NATO after September 11 and by giv-
ing their unanimous support for the anti-terrorist coalitionÕs
efforts. 
2. Even if Russia does not expressly object against the inclusion
of the Baltic States into NATO, this does not mean that it will con-
siderably change its present policy towards the Baltic States and
give up its efforts aimed at keeping the Baltic republics within its
sphere of influence. 
As a way to protect its interests, Russia will surely continue to
attempt to discredit the Baltic States on the international scene,
and it may also take measures to destabilise the internal situa-
tions in the Baltic republics in order to impede their integration
with NATO. To this end, it may take advantage of the presence of
the Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic States and of the
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media which this minority controls. Russia will surely also con-
tinue its negative campaign against Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
which it carries out in the international organisations such as the
OSCE and the Council of Europe. 
3. The consistent reinforcement of the giant Russian companiesÕ
positions in the Baltic States breeds fears that these countriesÕ
economic dependence on Russia may deepen, which, in turn,
may affect these countriesÕ policies, including the implementa-
tion of the Baltic StatesÕ foreign policy priorities, mainly their
aspiration to join NATO and the EU.
A new problem that will affect the Baltic StatesÕ economic situa-
tions to a large degree is the set of RussiaÕs initiatives aimed at
ending its dependence on the Baltic ports, which includes the
launch of the first part of the oil terminal in Primorsk. If Russia
continues this policy, the authorities of the Baltic states will be
forced not only to offer Russia new terms of transit of the Russian
raw materials, but also to be more favourably disposed to
Russian companies, mainly with regard to the privatisation poli-
cy. Thus, Russia will acquire one more significant instrument of
pressure that will enable it to exert more influence on the eco-
nomic policies of the Baltic States. 
4. As regards the Baltic StatesÕ negotiations with the EU, the
positive signals coming from Brussels seem to be well founded.
The Baltic States will surely strive to maintain the present tempo
of negotiations, because their determination to become members
of the EU, like the NATO membership aspirations, is motivated by
their ambition to obtain a security guarantee and to become
members of the integrated Europe. 
Lithuania faces the greatest challenge: in the negotiations it
needs to obtain considerable financial support for the closing
down of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant from the EU and to play
an active role in RussiaÕs dialogue with the EU on the future of the
Kaliningrad Oblast in the context of EU enlargement. 
Joanna Hyndle, Miryna Kutysz
Text completed in January 2002
1 Even though from the ethnic point of view, the Estonians do not belong to the
Balts group, for simplicity, in this text the inhabitants of Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia will be referred to as Balts, and their three countries as the Baltic
states.
2 The Russian army left Lithuania in 1993 and Estonia in 1994. As regards
Latvia, the Russian soldiers also left in 1994 but Latvia continued to negotiate
the issue of the radar station in Skrunda which remained in its territory.
The station was finally closed down in 1998 and the last Russian military base
was wound up in 1999. 
3 MAP was supposed to assist the countries aspiring to NATO membership 
in their preparations. Under the MAP, the aspiring states develop annual 
preparations programs based on which the subsequent assessment is issued.
Performance in compliance with the plan does not guarantee membership of
NATO.
4 Already in 2001, Lithuania spent 1.95 per cent of its GDP on this sector 
and it declares that in 2002, when the NATO summit in Prague is to take place,
its military expenses will reach 2 per cent of GDP. Estonia has announced that 
in 2001, its defence expenditures will account for 1.8 per cent of GDP, to reach 
2 per cent in 2002. Latvia has declared that it will spend 1.31 per cent of its
GDP on the army in 2001 and in 2002 this amount will increase to 1.75 per cent
of GDP. Expenditure of 2 per cent of GDP will be achieved by Latvia in 2003. 
5 On the occasion of discussions on the closing down of block 1, the Lithuanian
experts preliminarily quoted the amount of approx. 2.5 Ð 5 billion Euro. It is still
difficult to assess the costs of restructuring the town of Visaginas near which
the power plant is situated. 
6 In May 2000, the Lithuanian authorities decided to close down block 1 of the
Ignalina plant by 2005. This obligation was included in the National Energy
Strategy. The issue of key importance remains the decision as to block 2. 
The Lithuanians wanted to postpone the final solution of this issue until 2004,
hoping that by that time the EU would assume a specific obligation to pay 
the costs of the closing down operation for both blocks of the power plant 
and the broadly understood restructuring of the town of Visaginas, whose entire
population exists thanks to the power plant. Nevertheless, the EUÕs strict
demand induced the Prime Minister, the social democrat Algirdas Brazauskas 
to modify his attitude, even if before he was opposed to the idea of a rapid 
closing down of Ignalina. In November 2001, the Prime Minister said that
Lithuania would take the decision as to the date of the final closing down of
Ignalina as soon as 2002. 
7 October 1999. Even though the Latvians and Estonians have waived their 
territorial claims against Russia and the drafts of treaties were prepared,
Moscow still refuses to sign them. 
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8 The average consumption of gas in Lithuania is 3.2 billion m3 per year.
In Latvia and Estonia it is 1.3 billion m3 and 1 billion m3, respectively.
The consumption of oil in Lithuania is 68 thousand barrels per day, in Latvia it
is 37 thousand and in Estonia 28 thousand. www.eia.doe.gov
9 Approximately 1/3 of the GDP generated in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is
connected with the Russian goods and services market in this way or another.
Vneshnaya torgovlya, 2/1999. 
10 www.ventspils.lv, 02.01.2002.
11 The agreements regulating the withdrawal of the Russian army from Germany
via the territory of the Republic of Lithuania dated November 18, 1993 provided
the Lithuanian government a basis for the establishment, in October 1994, 
of the terms on which the Russian transit through the territory of Lithuania is
taking place now. These terms remain in force for a year but they may be
extended annually. Transit of military and hazardous cargo and unarmed military
personnel is conducted by trains exclusively. The term Òmilitary transitÓ does
not refer to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and nuclear, chemical and 
biological substances that may be used for the production of the WMD.
The transit of this kind of weapons and materials strictly prohibited. It is also
forbidden to transport military personnel together with arms and equipment and
to transport military personnel and cargoes of arms or military equipment in
opposite directions at the same time. It is prohibited to carry weapons, arms
military equipment together with ammunition or fuel. The total number of rail
cars per day must not exceed 110. The total number of the Russian Armed
Forces personnel crossing the territory of Lithuania at a time must not exceed
180 persons. The soldiers are prohibited to leave the train during the passage
across the territory of Lithuania and they must be accompanied by a military
officer.
12 Lietuvos Rytas, 24.12.2001.
13 This contribution to the discussion on the future of the Kaliningrad Oblast was
the study entitled Impact Assessment of LithuaniaÕs Integration into EU on
Relations Between Lithuania and Kaliningrad Oblast of Russian Federation.
The authors were Perti Joenniemi, Raimundas Lopata, Vladas Sirutavicius,
Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Lithuanian policy review , 2000/2(6).
14 Pursuant to the agreement of June 29, 1999 on the co-operation between
regions of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Lithuania.
15 Latvia, Estonia Ð Statistical Yearbook 2000.
16 In 1998, following the referendum on the abatement of the citizenship law,
the Latvian authorities abolished the system of the so called naturalisation
ÒwindowsÓ under which the longer a person without citizenship had lived 
in Latvia, the longer she or he had to wait for naturalisation. Under the new 
provisions, all persons permanently residing in Latvia are eligible to apply 
for Latvian citizenship but they have to pass an exam testing knowledge 
of the Latvian language and the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. Children
of non-citizens that were born after 1991 are granted citizenship automatically.
In 1995, Estonia amended its law on citizenship under which persons who 
had held permanent residence cards in Estonia for five years, had a certain
command of the Estonian language, knew the Estonian Constitution and 
complied with other minor requirements were eligible to apply for Estonian citi-
zenship. In order not to deprive people who were permanent residents of Estonia
before July 1990, i.e. before the issuing of permanent residence cards began, 
of the opportunity to acquire citizenship, it was decided that the duration of 
permanent residence may be calculated based on the Soviet address 
registration system that remained in force until July 1990. 
17 The majority of the most vocal protests of the Russian ethnic minority took
place in Riga in spring 1998. The demands included first and foremost 
the amending of the law on citizenship. It was also the time when the Russian
authorities introduced economic sanctions against Latvia. Action by the Russian
minority was supported by Russian extremists, i.e. the National Bolsheviks 
of Eduard Limonov who vandalised the building of the Latvian embassy in
Moscow in March 1998. Similarly vocal actions took place in June 2000 in Riga
when the Russian-speaking population protested against the sharpening of 
the law on state language.
18 The House of Representatives of the US Congress passed the resolution on
this matter on November 8, 2001. A similar resolution was to be considered by
the US Senate on December 19, 2001 but the decision was postponed until 
a later date as the issue required more in-depth discussion and debate.
19 Putin said that the Albanians, who account for approx. 20 per cent of the 
population of Macedonia, have more rights than the Russian-speaking minority
in Latvia, where they account for 40 per cent of the population. 
Gazeta.ru, Lenta.ru, December 24, 2001. 
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